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LITIGATING IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN 
FEDERAL COURT 
51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
Jeffrey S. Sutton.* New York, N.Y.: Oxford University 
Press. 2018. Pp. xi + 278. $29.95 (Hardcover). 
Michael T. Morley1 
INTRODUCTION 
It is somewhat ironic that a sitting federal judge, Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, would write a book challenging the standard model of 
American constitutional law, which presents life-tenured federal 
judges enforcing the U.S. Constitution as the primary defenders 
of individual liberty against racist states, craven elected officials, 
overzealous police, and heartless bureaucrats.2 In 51 Imperfect 
Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law, 
Sutton contends that state courts, constitutions, and even 
legislatures have played—and should continue to play—critical 
roles in promoting individual liberty (p. 2). In particular, Sutton 
 
 *  Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  
 1. Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Special 
thanks to Barbara Atwood, Michael Collins, Andrew Hessick, Jack Landau, Caprice 
Roberts, and Alan Trammell for their comments, suggestions, and feedback. I am also 
grateful to Brian Bix for his editorial assistance throughout this process, as well as 
Margaret Clark, Dylan Dunn, and Felicia Warren for their invaluable help in revising this 
piece.  
 2. See Owen Fiss, Law Is Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 257, 270 (2007); Burt 
Neuborne, The Role of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 
555 (2005). Consistent with this traditional view, Sutton acknowledges that the “U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized many of the rights it did between the 1940s and 1960s because 
many state courts (and state legislatures and state governors) resisted protecting individual 
rights, most notably in the South but hardly there alone” (p. 14).  
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joins the chorus of federal3 and state judges,4 as well as scholars,5 
who argue that state constitutions, interpreted and enforced by 
state judges, are an important source of potentially greater 
protection for many rights than the U.S. Constitution (pp. 1–2). 
Sutton contends that we “see American lawyers regularly 
taking just one shot rather than two to invalidate state or local 
laws,” by failing to raise or sufficiently brief arguments under 
state constitutions (p. 7). He reiterates this point throughout the 
book (pp. 8, 10, 15). It is difficult to gauge the empirical validity 
of Sutton’s claim that state constitutional rights are presently 
neglected by litigants and underenforced by courts. Although this 
was certainly the case in decades past, it is unclear whether state 
constitutions remain unnoticed and ignored; by the 1990s, 
commentators were acknowledging the depth of attention state 
 
 3. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977); Diane Sykes, The “New Federalism”: 
Confessions of a Former State Supreme Court Justice, 38 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 367, 392–
93 (2013); see also Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 641 (2016) (Scalia J., for the Court) (“The 
state courts may experiment all they want with their own constitutions, and often do so in 
the wake of this Court’s decisions.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454–55 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (endorsing “the emerging trend among high state courts of relying 
upon state constitutional protections of individual liberties”); Rodriguez v. San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (1973) (Marshall J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the 
Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state educational funding schemes 
under state constitutional provisions.”). 
 4. See, e.g., [Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice] Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We 
Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 723, 724 
(1991); [California Supreme Court Justice] Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State 
Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 396–97 (1988); [Oregon Supreme Court 
Justice] Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 379, 383 (1980); [New Jersey Supreme Court Justice] Stewart G. Pollock, State 
Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 707, 717 
(1983); [Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice] Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature 
of State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 440 (1996); cf. 
[Massachusetts Appeals Court Justice] Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams Made Me Do 
It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial Chauvinism, and Article 14 of Massachusetts’ Declaration 
of Rights, 77 MISS. L.J. 315, 342–43 (2007); see also Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The 
Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 211 n.4 
(2003) (citing articles by state court judges about the importance of relying on state 
constitutions to protect individual rights).  
 5. See Williams, supra note 4, at 211 (explaining that theorizing about the distinct 
role that state constitutions play in protecting individual rights “cannot be described as 
‘new’ anymore”); see, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and 
the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 98–99 (2000); Jennifer Friesen, 
State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become Independently Wealthy, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065, 1073–74 (1997); Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State 
Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (2011).  
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constitutions had received.6 
Sutton specifically points out the lack of state constitutional 
claims in federal court. He explains that, throughout his fifteen-
year tenure as a Sixth Circuit judge, he saw “many constitutional 
challenges to state or local laws,” yet can “recall just one instance 
in which the claimant meaningfully challenged the validity of a 
law on federal and state constitutional grounds” (p. 8). Attorneys’ 
ignorance of state constitutions or overreliance on federal 
protections may not be the main cause of Sutton’s experience, 
however. Rather, federal jurisdictional and procedural 
restrictions pose substantial obstacles—obstacles that Sutton 
largely does not acknowledge—to the adjudication of state 
constitutional claims in federal court. Since 51 Imperfect Solutions 
is aimed at least partly at a general audience, one would not 
expect it to offer a detailed discussion of the nuances of federal 
jurisdiction and procedure. This Review explores the major 
doctrines that hinder plaintiffs from pursuing state constitutional 
claims in federal court and suggests some initial reforms.7 
Part I begins by summarizing Sutton’s analysis of the role of 
state constitutions, courts, and legislatures in protecting 
individual liberty. This Part discusses the various ways in which 
Sutton contends that state constitutional law and federal 
constitutional law may interact with each other, briefly sketching 
the case studies he uses to illustrate each possible type of 
 
 6. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional 
Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 841 (1991) (“Among the most noteworthy 
developments in constitutional law during the past two decades has been the renewed 
reliance by state courts on state constitutions as independent sources of rights. . . . The 
willingness to look at state constitutions is no longer confined to a few adventuresome 
courts . . . .”); see also Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing 
Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights 
Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1997) (“The question of whether, and 
under what circumstances, it is legitimate for state courts to reach conclusions under their 
state constitutions that are more protective of rights than United States Supreme Court 
decisions is one of the most important questions of American constitutional federalism.”). 
 7. I am grateful to Professor Andrew Hessick for pointing out that one major reason 
why federal courts do not adjudicate state constitutional claims more frequently is that the 
federal habeas statute allows a state criminal defendant to collaterally attack his or her 
conviction only on the grounds that it violates the U.S. Constitution (or a federal law or 
treaty), rather than state constitutions, as well. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2018); e.g., Wills v. 
Engler, 532 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1976); Velez v. Martinez, 510 F.2d 605, 606 (1st Cir. 
1975). The scope of federal habeas review is primarily within Congress’ control, however. 
This Review focuses on judicially created doctrines that may deter litigants from pursuing 
state constitutional claims in federal court or preclude federal courts from adjudicating 
them. 
MORLEY 35:2 12/29/2020 11:21 PM 
404 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:401 
 
relationship. 
Part II explains how abstention doctrine under Railroad 
Commission of Texas v. Pullman often precludes federal courts 
from adjudicating state constitutional claims,8 but in inconsistent 
ways that fail to fully respect the independence of federal and 
state constitutional provisions. Challenging current doctrine, this 
Part recommends that federal courts should apply a single 
uniform standard when deciding whether to apply Pullman 
abstention due to a state constitutional provision, rather than 
basing abstention decisions on whether that provision has an 
analogue in the U.S. Constitution, or is worded broadly or 
narrowly. It further suggests that a federal court should not 
consider Pullman abstention in a federal constitutional challenge 
to a state or local legal provision based on potential state 
constitutional infirmities unless the federal suit actually includes 
a claim under the state constitution. This Part also contends that 
federal courts should ensure that their judgments concerning state 
constitutional issues do not prevent other rightholders from 
relitigating them in state court. Thus, federal courts should 
neither certify statewide classes nor grant statewide defendant-
oriented injunctions in cases involving state constitutional claims. 
Part III demonstrates that Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity is another obstacle to federal adjudication of state 
constitutional claims. The Pennhurst Doctrine protects states, 
state agencies, and state officials from being sued in federal court 
for alleged violations of state law, including the state constitution.9 
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should mitigate the 
effects of the Pennhurst Doctrine by creating an exception to res 
judicata principles. When the doctrine forces litigants to split their 
federal and state constitutional claims between federal and state 
courts, the state court judgment should not give rise to a res 
judicata effect in federal court.10 
Part IV explains that, even when district courts are permitted 
to adjudicate state constitutional claims, they frequently decline 
to do so by exercising their discretion under the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute.11 Rather than establishing a purely 
discretionary or completely independent standard for refusing to 
 
 8. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).  
 9. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984). 
 10. Cf. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 417–19 (1964). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).  
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hear state law claims, the supplemental jurisdiction statute should 
be read consistently with Pullman. A federal court should apply 
the same standard to decide whether to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over pendent state law claims as it would to decide 
whether to abstain from adjudicating a state law issue in a case 
involving a federal constitutional claim. Part V concludes. 
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
51 Imperfect Solutions consists primarily of case studies 
illustrating the various ways in which federal and state 
constitutional law interact with each other. Sutton argues that 
state constitutions—as well as state courts, legislatures, and 
executive officials—have often provided greater protection for 
individual rights than the U.S. Constitution. This most obviously 
occurs when a state constitution contains provisions that either 
lack analogues in the U.S. Constitution or are phrased more 
broadly than their federal counterparts (pp. 33, 35). Many state 
constitutions, for example, expressly protect the right to privacy12 
and contain requirements or guarantees relating to public 
education.13 In contrast, Sutton explains that, in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court 
declined to recognize education as a fundamental right under the 
U.S. Constitution.14 Rejecting wealth as a suspect classification for 
Equal Protection purposes, the Rodriguez Court also upheld the 
constitutionality of disparities in per-pupil spending among states’ 
public school districts.15 In the years following that ruling, 
however, numerous state supreme courts construed provisions of 
their respective state constitutions that require states to establish 
public school systems16 to mandate some degree of equalized 
 
 12. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
 13. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; 
W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.  
 14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–37 (1973).  
 15. Id. at 28–29, 54–55.  
 16. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall make such 
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, 
will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state. . . .”); 
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the 
preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature 
of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of 
an efficient system of public free schools. . . .”).  
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spending among school districts (pp. 30–32, 35).17 
A state supreme court also may provide additional 
protections for individual liberty by interpreting and applying a 
state constitution’s language differently than federal courts have 
construed similar or identical provisions in the federal charter 
(p. 16).18 Sutton describes how, in Wolf v. Colorado, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches—but not the exclusionary rule—was 
incorporated against state governments.19 This ruling allowed 
state law enforcement officials to use evidence seized in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment in state prosecutions. Nearly half the 
states went on to reject Wolf by adopting their own state-specific 
exclusionary rules, either through the legislature’s enactment of 
statutory restrictions or the state supreme court’s interpretation 
of the state constitution’s analogue to the Fourth Amendment 
(pp. 58–59). 
Likewise, a few decades later, when the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized the “good faith” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon,20 many 
state supreme courts declined to follow suit, refusing to create 
such an exception under their state constitutions (p. 67). Sutton 
also points out that, in the three years between the Supreme 
 
 17. Sutton points out, “[t]he fortunes of school-funding advocates markedly 
improved when they shifted their theories of the case from the negative equal-protection-
like clauses of the state constitutions to the positive school-funding clauses of the state 
constitutions” (p. 35). For a more detailed discussion of the use of state constitutional 
provisions to reform public school funding systems, see Robert M. Jensen, Advancing 
Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 2 
(1997).  
 18. The California Constitution expressly disclaims any reliance on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of U.S. Constitution, stating: “Rights guaranteed by this 
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.” 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. Under this provision, “even when the terms of the California 
Constitution are textually identical to those of the federal Constitution, the proper 
interpretation of the state constitutional provision is not invariably identical to the federal 
courts’ interpretation of the corresponding provision contained in the federal 
Constitution.” Am. Acad. of Pediatricians v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997). 
Proposition 115 added the qualification that the state constitution “shall not be construed 
by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the 
Constitution of the United States.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (1990). The California 
Supreme Court held that this provision was invalid because it was “so far reaching as to 
amount to a constitutional revision beyond the scope of the initiative process.” Raven v. 
Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086 (Cal. 1990). 
 19. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–29, 31 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 644–45, 651 (1961). 
 20. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).  
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Court’s ruling in Gobitis v. Minersville School District that public 
school students may be compelled to salute the American flag21 
and the Court’s repudiation of that conclusion in West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette,22 a few state supreme courts 
construed their state constitutions differently, protecting students 
from such coerced expression (pp. 160, 170). 
Sutton explains that state constitutional rulings also affect 
federal constitutional law, both by providing a model that may 
influence the U.S. Supreme Court’s construction of comparable 
language in the U.S. Constitution, as well as by demonstrating the 
benefits and drawbacks of various possible constructions (pp. 20, 
82, 212). He declares, for example, “[t]he development of the 
exclusionary rule followed (and continues to follow) a Hegelian 
path, as the state and federal courts respond to strengths and 
weaknesses of their own decisions and to those of other 
sovereigns” (p. 67). As mentioned above, the Supreme Court had 
initially declined in Wolf v. Colorado to apply the exclusionary 
rule to searches by state and local officials that violated the Fourth 
Amendment.23 One of the main factors that ultimately led the 
Court to overturn Wolf in Mapp v. Ohio24 was the fact that many 
state supreme courts had adopted the exclusionary rule under 
their respective state constitutions (p. 61). Those rulings allowed 
the Court to assess states’ practical experience with extending the 
rule to state and local police (p. 69). Moreover, Sutton suggests 
that the state courts’ rulings enhanced Mapp’s legitimacy by 
contributing to a perception that the Court was responding to 
“shifting norms,” rather than its own subjective preferences (pp. 
69–70). 
Beyond emphasizing the importance of state constitutions in 
the protection of individual rights, Sutton also seeks to 
rehabilitate the frequent image of state legislators and executive 
officials as the villains of American constitutional law. He offers 
a counternarrative to the standard model, arguing that such actors 
have sometimes been more effective than federal courts in 
protecting individual rights (pp. 2, 6). When the U.S. Supreme 
Court refuses to recognize rights under the federal Constitution, 
 
 21. Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940), overruled by W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 22. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.  
 23. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27–29, 31.  
 24. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644–45, 651. 
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Sutton claims, state officials sometimes step in to fill the gap as a 
matter of policy. 
Following Wolf, for example, some state legislatures enacted 
statutes applying the exclusionary rule to unconstitutional 
seizures by state and local police (p. 59). And after the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Buck v. Bell upholding Virginia’s involuntary 
sterilization law,25 it was state legislatures, rather than federal or 
state courts, that ultimately eliminated or greatly narrowed most 
statutes of that nature (pp. 124–127). Sutton contends, “[t]he state 
legislatures became the eventual heroes of their own story” 
(p. 125)—though of course it was state legislatures that had 
enacted compulsory sterilization laws in the first place. Even 
while sterilization laws remained on the books, Sutton maintains, 
state executive officials were often reluctant to implement them, 
providing an additional layer of protection for reproductive 
freedom (pp. 91–92, 119, 125–126). 
These case studies lead Sutton to conclude, similarly to 
Alexander Bickel,26 that federal courts should sometimes refrain 
from adjudicating important constitutional issues (p. 5)—though 
he does not provide concrete guidance on how they should make 
that decision. “Maximizing liberty,” Sutton asserts, “does not 
invariably follow from a national rule” (p. 77). As a corollary, he 
adds, “[i]n a democracy, there is something to be said for allowing 
the gravitational forces of representative government to cure 
problems of its own making” (pp. 127, 215–216). 
Sutton further cautions that, when the Supreme Court 
recognizes a right, it often applies what he calls a “federalism 
discount”: defining the right narrowly since it will apply in a wide 
range of circumstances across the entire nation (p. 17).27 He states, 
“[o]ne potential price of . . . a nationwide rule on any 
constitutional right . . . may be a nationwide ebbing of the 
underlying standard, if not cutbacks on other constitutional rights 
and principles” (p. 75). This argument is a variation of Daryl 
Levinson’s “remedial equilibration” theory, which teaches that 
 
 25. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927).  
 26. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 131–33 (2d ed. 1986). 
 27. See also Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow: Legitimacy of State 
Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 389–90, 396 (1984) 
(explaining that state supreme courts need not take into account the same “federalism 
concerns” when construing their state constitutions at the U.S. Supreme Court must 
consider when interpreting the federal Constitution). 
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the practical consequences of recognizing a right often influence 
the Court’s definition of that right.28 A state court may have 
greater flexibility than the U.S. Supreme Court when interpreting 
its constitution, Sutton contends, because its rulings apply only to 
a single state and can be tailored to that state’s particular 
circumstances, culture, and needs, to which its judges are attuned 
(pp. 16, 36).29 
For example, Sutton suggests that the Supreme Court has 
been quick to recognize exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such 
as Leon’s good faith exception, as a way of limiting the rule’s 
impact on the criminal justice system because Mapp v. Ohio 
extended it to state and local police (pp. 71–73). Sutton speculates 
that, had the rule remained limited solely to federal law 
enforcement officials, as it had been under Wolf, the Court might 
have been willing to define it more robustly, subject to far fewer 
exceptions (p. 71). He likewise attributes the Court’s refusal in 
Linkletter v. Walker30 to apply the rule retroactively to its desire 
to contain Mapp’s consequences (p. 74). 
Moreover, a Supreme Court ruling affirmatively refusing to 
recognize a right may lead state courts to construe their state 
constitutions similarly, reducing those charters’ potential as 
alternate sources of individual liberties. Sutton points out that, 
prior to Buck v. Bell, many state courts had invalidated coercive 
sterilization measures on federal or state constitutional grounds 
(pp. 92, 107). “Unlike the state courts’ nearly uniform resistance 
to eugenics legislation before Buck,” however, “most of the state 
courts fell in line after Buck, even when it came to their 
independent, uniquely sovereign, and final authority to construe 
their own constitutions” (p. 118; see also pp. 125, 131). Sutton 
argues that the Court’s “clanging endorsement of eugenics policy” 
even caused legislative repeal of such laws to come about “more 
slowly” (p. 126). 
 
 28. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 857, 889–90 (1999) (discussing remedial deterrence).  
 29. Cf. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1993) (arguing that it is likely “an anachronism or romantic 
myth” to assume that each state is a unique political community). Sutton further suggests 
that state supreme courts are often better situated than a federal court to force legislatures 
to raise taxes (p. 38). And, if a state supreme court’s interpretation of a state constitution 
proves erroneous or unworkable, it is more readily correctable than a U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling, whether through subsequent cases or constitutional amendment (pp. 18, 36).  
 30. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1965). 
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This reasoning leads Sutton to suggest that public school 
students in indigent school districts may have been better off in 
the long run as a result of losing Rodriguez (p. 35). Had the 
Supreme Court established a federal right to an education, or to 
equal funding for education, Sutton contends, it likely would have 
applied a federalism discount, defining the scope of that right 
much more narrowly than state courts have construed their state 
constitutions (pp. 36–37). And state supreme courts may have 
been tempted to adopt that same narrow baseline in interpreting 
those state constitutions. Thus, Sutton hypothesizes, the U.S. 
Supreme Court can sometimes best protect liberty by refraining 
from even considering the merits of an issue, leaving it instead to 
state officials and state constitutions—a surprising reversal of the 
traditional narrative of American constitutional law. 
II. ABSTENTION AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Sutton explains that, despite the importance of state 
constitutions in protecting individual rights, he has heard only a 
single state constitutional claim over the course of his entire 
career as a federal judge (p. 8). A major reason why litigants might 
refrain from pursuing state constitutional claims in federal court 
is because, in the modern era, the U.S. Supreme Court often 
requires federal courts to abstain from adjudicating them. Current 
abstention doctrine is internally inconsistent, however, and not 
well-tailored to protecting the prerogative of state courts to 
interpret their respective state constitutions. 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in 
the era prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,31 state supreme 
courts did not always have the last word on the meaning of their 
state constitutions. At the time, the Supreme Court construed the 
Rules of Decision Act32 as requiring federal courts sitting in 
diversity to generally apply state constitutions and statutes, as well 
as state court rulings interpreting them.33 Federal courts in 
diversity cases were also required to follow state courts’ rulings 
on issues of local law, such as property rights.34 
 
 31. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 32. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 
(2018). 
 33. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).  
 34. See id. (holding that a federal court sitting in diversity was generally required to 
follow state court rulings concerning “rights and titles to things having a permanent 
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“[Q]uestions of a more general nature,” in contrast—
particularly commercial matters—were governed by general law 
rather than state common law.35 General law was viewed not as 
the law of a particular sovereign or jurisdiction, such as the federal 
government or a state, but rather a set of universally applicable 
principles.36 Whereas states were required to follow the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal law, they were not 
similarly bound regarding its view of general law. Thus, federal 
and state courts within a jurisdiction could apply different bodies 
of law to the same case, with a federal court invoking an ostensibly 
nationally uniform body of general law, and a state court relying 
upon its own common law.37 
Over time, the domain of general law spread, extending 
beyond commercial transactions to embrace questions of 
“negligence, punitive damages, and property rights.”38 When a 
state statute or even state constitutional provision touched on an 
area that fell within the federal judiciary’s conception of general 
law, federal courts would apply general law principles rather than 
the state supreme court’s otherwise definitive interpretation of 
that provision.39 “[T]he federal courts gave independent and 
 
locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate and other matters immovable and 
intraterritorial in their nature and character”).  
 35. Id. at 18–19. Federal courts during this era took a similar approach to equity, 
applying a uniform body of traditional equitable principles derived from the English Court 
of Chancery to all cases that came before them, including diversity cases, rather than state 
statutes or court rulings concerning equitable issues. Despite Erie’s abolition of general 
law, federal courts continue—without a valid foundation—to apply this approach to 
equitable remedies. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 
217, 247–49 (2018) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1945)). 
 36. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18–19.  
 37. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 698–99 (2013); 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4502 (3d ed. 
2019).  
 38. Bellia & Clark, supra note 37, at 698–99; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 75–76 (1938); see, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 373 (1893); 
Collins v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428–29 (1862).  
 39. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development 
of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (2000); see also Bellia & Clark, 
supra note 37, at 699 n.187 (citing Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 290 F. 505, 509 (E.D. 
Okla. 1923)); Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in 
a Post-Westphalian World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 132 (2007) (“[F]ederal courts would 
sometimes refuse to follow state statutes or state constitutions, as interpreted by state 
courts, if the federal court found that the state law violated more universal principles of 
jurisprudence.”). “Most notoriously, in some 250 cases, the Supreme Court held that the 
general common law trumped statutes agrarian states had enacted to protect local debtors 
against Eastern-owned railroad creditors, provoking resentment in state courts.” David 
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largely uniform readings to a variety of ostensibly state 
constitutional questions including takings of property, taxing and 
spending for public purposes, rate making and delegation 
doctrines, and the permissible limits of governmental power.”40 
In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, for example, a municipality had 
issued bonds under a state law that the Iowa Supreme Court had 
repeatedly held constitutional in several cases both before and 
after the bonds were issued.41 The Iowa Supreme Court later 
overturned those earlier cases in State ex rel. Burlington & 
Missouri River R.R. Co. v. County of Wapello, holding that the 
underlying law violated the state constitution and any bonds 
issued under it were invalid.42 
The municipality subsequently stopped paying interest on 
the bonds, and the bondholders sued in diversity in federal court. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that it was generally required 
to apply state courts’ interpretations of state constitutions but, 
since this was an “exceptional case,” it declined to follow 
Wapello.43 Importantly, the Court did not hold that Wapello was 
contrary to the U.S. Constitution.44 Rather, it declared that it 
would not “follow every such oscillation, from whatever cause 
arising, that may possibly occur” in state courts’ interpretations of 
their constitutions.45 Accordingly, it chose to follow the Iowa 
Supreme Court’s earlier rulings upholding the challenged law, 
because they were “sustained by reason and authority” and “in 
harmony with” sixteen other states’ rulings.46 The Court 
memorably concluded: “We shall never immolate truth, justice, 
and the law, because a State tribunal has erected the altar and 
decreed the sacrifice.”47 
 
Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of 
Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2007). 
 40. Collins, supra note 39, at 1265. 
 41. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 202-05 (1864). 
 42. Id. at 205 (citing State ex rel. Burlington & Mo. River R.R. Co. v. Cnty. of 
Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862)).  
 43. Id. at 206.  
 44. Cf. id. at 209 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not pretended that either the statute 
of Iowa, or its constitution, or the decision of its courts thereon, are in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States. . . .”); see also James B. Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. 
Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311, 319 (1891).  
 45. Gelpcke, 68 U.S. at 205. 
 46. Id. at 205–06.  
 47. Id. at 206–07; see also Douglass v. Cnty. of Pike, 101 U.S. 677, 686 (1879) 
(“[W]here different constructions have been given to the same statute at different times, 
we have never felt ourselves bound to follow the latest decisions, if thereby contract rights 
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Professor James B. Thayer defended Gelpcke on the grounds 
that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction had a special 
obligation to interpret state law independently of state courts to 
ensure fair treatment of other states’ citizens.48 Since Gelpcke 
involved a matter of general law49 rather than federal law, it was 
not binding on state courts. Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court, 
applying its own precedents, could continue to treat the 
challenged state law as unconstitutional and refuse to enforce 
bonds that a federal court, applying Gelpcke’s conception of 
general law, would deem legally valid and enforceable.50 
The U.S. Supreme Court expressly invoked general law in 
Pine Grove v. Talcott, in which it similarly refused to follow the 
Michigan Supreme Court’s rulings concerning the state 
constitution because they were “not satisfactory to our minds.”51 
The Pine Grove Court declared, “The question before us”—
whether a Michigan law governing bond issuances violated the 
state constitution—“belongs to the domain of general 
jurisprudence.”52 Mechanically following the state supreme 
court’s construction of its state constitution on an issue of general 
law would make a “solemn mockery” of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.53 
In Erie, the Court rejected the notion of general law, holding 
that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply both state 
statutes and judicial rulings, regardless of whether a matter would 
be deemed “local,” except when federal law requires otherwise.54 
Following Erie, the Court reconceptualized its role in construing 
state constitutions and statutes as trying to anticipate how the 
state supreme court would resolve the matter.55 This generally, 
 
which have accrued under earlier rulings will be injuriously affected.”); Havemeyer v. Iowa 
Cnty., 70 U.S. 294, 303 (1866).  
 48. See Thayer, supra note 44, at 320.  
 49. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and 
Commerce, 1836–1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 471, 494 (suggesting that Gelpcke was an extension 
of general law). 
 50. See Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452 (1924).  
 51. Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. 666, 677 (1873).  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 678; see also Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. 678, 690 (1872) (holding that the 
issue of whether certain state and local taxes were imposed for a “public” purpose is “not 
a question of constitutional construction,” but rather a “question of general law,” and “[i]ts 
solution must be sought not in the decisions of any single State tribunal, but in general 
principles common to all courts”).  
 54. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  
 55. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie 
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though not always, meant following the most recent state supreme 
court ruling on the issue.56 Questions remained, however, about 
the federal judiciary’s proper role in cases where a state’s caselaw 
did not clearly reveal how the state judiciary would interpret or 
apply the state constitution. 
Over the years, the Court has developed a series of 
abstention doctrines that prevent federal courts from resolving 
doubtful state law issues. Most saliently, Railroad Commission of 
Texas v. Pullman requires federal courts to abstain from 
adjudicating federal constitutional issues that may be unnecessary 
to address, based on how a state court resolves an unsettled 
question of state law.57 Federal courts typically engage in Pullman 
abstention to give state courts an opportunity to interpret a vague 
or ambiguous state legal provision in a manner that would 
eliminate federal constitutional concerns.58 Litigants who initiate 
state court proceedings due to Pullman abstention may reserve 
their right to return to federal court, if necessary, to litigate their 
federal claims.59 Although res judicata would ordinarily prohibit 
claim splitting of this sort, England v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners created an exception to res judicata to allow 
litigants forced into state court by Pullman abstention to have 
their federal claims adjudicated back in federal court, instead.60 
As an alternative to complete abstention, a federal court may 
instead certify state law issues to the state supreme court for 
resolution, when state law authorizes that process.61 Whether a 
federal court engages in abstention or certification, a litigant who 
devoted time and resources to pursuing pendent state 
constitutional claims is unable to have them adjudicated in its 
chosen forum.62 
Pullman abstention arises from the constitutional avoidance 
 
World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1424 (2005).  
 56. See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding 
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 292–93 (1946) (explaining that 
federal courts should be able to draw upon the same range of authorities as a state supreme 
court to predict whether that state supreme court would overturn one of its precedents).  
 57. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).  
 58. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); see, e.g., 
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 146–47 (1976).  
 59. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 417–19 (1964). 
 60. Id.  
 61. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997); see also 
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2188 (2019).  
 62. 15A WILLIAM MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 106.64.  
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doctrine and Article III’s prohibition on advisory opinions.63 
Potentially dispositive state law issues—such as a pendent state 
constitutional claim or a question of statutory interpretation—
should be resolved prior to a federal constitutional claim, to 
prevent a potentially unnecessary ruling under the U.S. 
Constitution. Such concerns do not explain, however, whether the 
federal or state court should resolve the state law issue.64 
Pullman requires a federal court to defer to state courts 
primarily to avoid the risk of reaching an erroneous state law 
ruling.65 Federal courts’ incorrect predictions or conclusions about 
state law “inevitably skew the decisions of persons and businesses 
who rely on them and inequitably affect the losing federal litigant 
who cannot appeal the decision to the state supreme court; they 
may even mislead lower state courts that may be inclined to accept 
federal predictions as applicable precedent.”66 Abstention is also 
a matter of comity, demonstrating respect for the state judiciary’s 
primary role in interpreting state law.67 
In other contexts, however, such as diversity cases, the 
Supreme Court has held that federal courts generally may not 
abstain from adjudicating unresolved state law issues due to their 
difficulty or indeterminacy.68 And many circuits have held that, in 
federal question cases, concerns about erroneously resolving state 
law issues do not always permit abstention, such as when the case 
involves federal statutory claims rather than claims under the U.S. 
Constitution,69 or cases in which the plaintiffs seek damages rather 
 
 63. See R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, at 499–500 (1941).  
 64. Cf. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909) (holding that 
a federal court may resolve a case that raises both federal and state claims by adjudicating 
the state law issue).  
 65. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. at 499–500.  
 66. Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the 
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1681 (1992).  
 67. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415–16 (1964).  
 68. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943); accord Lehman Bros. v. 
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974). The Supreme Court has recognized a few exceptions to 
Meredith, as in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). 
Thibodaux requires federal courts to abstain from adjudicating difficult, unresolved state 
law issues that are “intimately involved with sovereign prerogative,” such as eminent 
domain. Cf. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959) (holding 
that federal courts may not abstain from state eminent domain cases where state law is 
“clear and certain”). The Thibodaux exception is “narrow,” however, Jonathan Remy 
Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1683–84, 1684 n.39 (2003), and thus seldom likely to prevent a 
federal court from adjudicating state constitutional claims.  
 69. WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 4242; MOORE, supra note 62, § 122.21[d]. 
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than equitable relief.70  
The Court’s approach to Pullman abstention is similarly 
conflicted in federal constitutional challenges to legal provisions 
that also may violate a state constitution. In Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could 
bring a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process challenge 
to a state law without first (or also) challenging it under the state 
constitution’s due process provision.71 It emphasized that 
plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state court remedies before 
invoking a federal court’s broad federal question jurisdiction.72 
Read in isolation, Constantineau appears to hold that abstention 
is appropriate only when a state court could eliminate the need to 
adjudicate a federal constitutional claim by resolving some 
ambiguity or vagueness in the legal provision at issue, rather than 
by considering potential state constitutional challenges to it.73 
Reetz v. Bozanich complicates the issue, however.74 There, 
the plaintiff challenged state fishing laws and regulations under 
both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as 
well as a provision of the Alaska Constitution specifically relating 
to fishing that lacks any federal analogue.75 The district court held 
that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the lower 
court should have abstained to give the state courts a chance to 
consider the state constitutional challenge first.76 
The upshot of Constantineau and Reetz appears to be that 
federal courts must abstain from adjudicating a federal 
constitutional claim only when the legal provision at issue may be 
challenged under a state constitutional provision that lacks a 
federal analogue and specifically applies to a particular subject 
area.77 Abstention is not required when the potentially relevant 
 
 70. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996) (holding that a federal 
court may dismiss or remand to state court a suit seeking equitable or discretionary relief, 
but only “stay actions for damages based on abstention principles”).  
 71. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1971). 
 72. Id. at 439.  
 73. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.2, at 839–40 (7th ed. 
2016).  
 74. Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). 
 75. Id. at 84 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15).  
 76. Id. at 87.  
 77. Id.; e.g., Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Ct. v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84–85 (1975) (holding 
that the lower court should have abstained from adjudicating a federal equal protection 
challenge to a redistricting statute to allow state courts to consider whether the measure 
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state constitutional provision is “broad,” “sweeping,”78 and 
comparable to a provision in the U.S. Constitution,79 such as an 
Equal Protection80 or Due Process Clause. This rule applies 
regardless of whether the plaintiff in the federal lawsuit includes 
a state constitutional challenge in its complaint.81 Not all Supreme 
Court precedents are entirely consistent with that dichotomy, 
however.82 
The Court’s unconvincing primary explanation for this 
dichotomy is that some limiting principle is necessary to prevent 
federal courts from abstaining too frequently in constitutional 
cases.83 Since most state constitutions have general due process 
and equal protection clauses, requiring abstention whenever a 
litigant brings a federal due process or equal protection claim 
would interfere with a wide swath of federal constitutional 
litigation and amount to de facto exhaustion requirement.84 
While Sutton contends that most plaintiffs are indifferent to 
the grounds on which they win a case (p. 9), many public interest 
 
violated state constitutional provisions concerning the length of officeholders’ terms); 
Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971) (holding that the lower court should have 
abstained from adjudicating a federal equal protection challenge to changes to the state’s 
system for funding public schools to allow state courts to first determine whether they 
violated the state constitution); see WRIGHT, supra note 37, § 4242 (“The proper line 
appears to be that abstention is in order if the case may turn on the interpretation of some 
specialized state constitutional provision, but not if the state provision is substantially 
similar to the federal provision that is the basis of the federal challenge.”); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 73, § 12.2, at 840. 
 78. Examining Bd. of Engrs., Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 
572, 598 (1976) (holding that abstention was not required to allow Puerto Rican courts to 
consider the validity of the challenged statute under the Puerto Rico Constitution’s anti-
discrimination and equal protection provisions).  
 79. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237 n.4 (1984).  
 80. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971).  
 81. Compare Reetz, 397 U.S. at 87 (requiring Pullman abstention in case involving 
both federal and state constitutional challenges), with Askew, 401 U.S. at 478 (requiring 
Pullman abstention where plaintiff brought only a federal constitutional challenge). 
 82. See, e.g., City of Meridian v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639, 641 (1959) 
(holding, in a case involving claims under both the federal and state constitutions’ 
Contracts Clauses, that when a state court’s “evaluation of [a state law’s] validity under 
the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal 
Constitution, the federal court should hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision 
unnecessarily”).  
 83. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 598 (declining to require abstention so that Puerto 
Rico’s courts could determine whether the challenged statute violated “broad and 
sweeping” provisions in Puerto Rico’s Constitution to avoid “convert[ing] abstention from 
an exception into a general rule”).  
 84. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1426–27 (1999).  
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organizations that bring constitutional challenges would often 
prefer to generate favorable precedents in federal courts of 
appeals or the Supreme Court under the federal Constitution, 
because they would be much more widely applicable than a state 
supreme court’s ruling.85 Indeed, a federal court’s ruling on a 
matter of state constitutional law, while a potentially persuasive 
precedent, would not even be binding on state courts.86 
Despite Sutton’s disappointment that litigants have generally 
avoided pursuing state constitutional claims in federal court  
(p. 8), he embraces abstention and certification of state 
constitutional questions to state courts (p. 197). He explains that 
abstention ensures that federal courts do not “intrud[e] on 
sensitive and complicated issues of state law without giving the 
state courts a chance to review, and perhaps resolve, the matter 
first” (p. 197). He also promotes certification as an alternative 
that “state courts should welcome” (p. 198). 
This Review is not the appropriate venue for a 
comprehensive theory of federal court review of state law claims, 
but four initial observations are in order. First, most basically, if 
the Supreme Court were to agree with Sutton that litigants should 
assert state constitutional claims in federal court more frequently, 
it must revisit Pullman abstention and other related doctrines, 
such as certification, that may deter or hinder them from doing so. 
Under the Court’s current approach, a plaintiff who challenges a 
state or local legal provision under both the federal and state 
constitutions increases the risk of having its federal claim delayed. 
Although a federal court may abstain regardless of whether a 
plaintiff actually asserts a state constitutional claim,87 framing a 
strong claim under the state constitution and affirmatively 
bringing it to the court’s attention underscores its importance. 
Whether the federal court abstains in favor of separate state 
litigation or instead certifies the state law question to the state 
supreme court, the plaintiff must participate in an entirely new set 
of proceedings.88 Moreover, the state court may be less hospitable 
 
 85. Public interest groups’ desire to secure the broadest possible impact for favorable 
judicial rulings has contributed to controversies over the validity of nationwide injunctions. 
See Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2019).  
 86. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); see also Amanda Frost, Inferiority 
Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of 
Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 76 (2015). 
 87. See, e.g., Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971). 
 88. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
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to the plaintiff’s claims, and its findings or reasoning may 
negatively influence the federal court if the case returns there. 
Second, in any event, the Supreme Court should revisit the 
Constantineau-Reetz dichotomy. State supreme courts have the 
prerogative to construe their constitutions differently from the 
federal Constitution, even when both documents’ language is 
identical.89 Accordingly, a state court’s opportunity to interpret or 
apply its constitution generally should not depend on whether a 
parallel provision happens to exist in the U.S. Constitution, or the 
provision can be characterized as broad or narrow.90 The federal 
judiciary’s interests in both avoiding legally inaccurate 
conclusions and minimizing friction with state courts is the same 
regardless of how broadly or narrowly a state constitutional 
provision is drafted. Thus, at a minimum, the Supreme Court 
should adopt a standard for Pullman abstention that applies 
consistently across all types of state constitutional provisions—
regardless of whether that standard ultimately entrusts the task of 
resolving state constitutional issues in federal cases to federal 
courts, state courts, or some combination of the two.91 
Third, when a plaintiff brings a federal constitutional 
challenge to a state or local legal provision, the federal court 
should not consider abstaining on the grounds that the provision 
may be subject to challenge under the state constitution unless the 
 
(“While certification may engender less delay and create fewer additional expenses for 
litigants than would abstention, it entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary 
decision of the state question on the merits by the federal court.”); AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 293–94 (1968). 
 89. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); Brennan, supra 
note 3, at 489; cf. Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for 
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 457, 486–90 (2018) 
(demonstrating how various jurisdictions may adapt different interpretations of the same 
legal standard).  
 90. Concerns about state constitutional provisions that are part of a detailed, 
integrated regulatory scheme may instead be addressed in the context of abstention under 
Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) (requiring federal courts to abstain from 
adjudicating difficult state law issues when states have created complex regulatory schemes 
implemented by administrative agencies); see, e.g., Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. So. Ry. Co., 
341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 
491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (defining the “Burford doctrine”).  
 91. Part IV of this Review suggests that the standard governing Pullman abstention 
in constitutional cases involving unsettled issues of state law should also apply to a district 
court’s decision about whether to decline supplemental jurisdiction in a federal question 
case over a pendent state law claim that raises a novel state law issue, see 28 
U.S.C.  § 1367(c)(1) (2018).  
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plaintiff has included a state constitutional claim in the 
complaint.92 The plaintiff is master of its complaint and may 
determine the causes of action it wishes to pursue93 and, through 
its choice of claims or parties,94 the forum that will adjudicate the 
matter.95 A federal court should not compel a plaintiff to pursue a 
different cause of action in a different court as a condition of 
having its federal constitutional claim adjudicated. Under current 
law, a federal court will generally not decline to adjudicate a 
federal constitutional claim on the grounds that the plaintiffs 
could have brought a federal statutory challenge instead. 
Potential causes of action under state constitutions should not 
pose greater obstacles to the adjudication of federal constitutional 
claims. 
Pullman abstention is appropriate where an antecedent state 
law question, such as the proper meaning of a state law, poses an 
obstacle to the accurate resolution of a federal constitutional 
claim. But the fact that a state or local legal provision may be 
invalid on state constitutional grounds should not preclude a 
plaintiff from pursuing their federal constitutional claims. Such an 
approach impermissibly turns abstention into an exhaustion 
requirement.96 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when federal courts 
adjudicate state constitutional claims, they should not preclude or 
seriously impede the state judiciary from reconsidering the issue 
in subsequent cases. Thus, a federal court should not certify a 
statewide plaintiff class of all rightholders throughout the state in 
cases involving a state constitutional challenge to a legal 
provision.97 Similarly, federal courts should generally decline to 
 
 92. Cf. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (“The fact that 
there may be buried in the record a nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by itself 
enough to invoke this rule [of avoiding constitutional questions].”).  
 93. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398–99 (1987).  
 94. See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 91 (2005), quoting MOORE, supra 
note 62, § 107.14[2][c], at 107–67.  
 95. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398–99; Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 39 
(1909) (“The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where there is a choice 
cannot be properly denied.”). 
 96. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971). Additionally, Pullman 
abstention is categorically unnecessary based on a state constitutional provision when the 
state supreme court has adopted a strict, exceptionless “lockstep” interpretation of the 
provision at issue. In such cases, since the meaning of the state constitution tracks the 
federal constitution, there is no need for the federal court to delay in adjudicating the 
federal constitutional issue—even if the state courts have never addressed it.  
 97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  
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enforce a state constitution by entering a statewide defendant-
oriented injunction completely prohibiting enforcement of a legal 
provision against anyone, anywhere in the state.98 Statewide 
classes and defendant-oriented injunctions impact rightholders 
throughout the state, typically precluding or mooting subsequent 
relitigation, including in state courts. If a federal court believes 
these types of measures would be appropriate or necessary, it 
should either abstain or, as discussed in Part IV, decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional 
claim.99 
Though these proposed reforms do not purport to address 
the central question of the federal judiciary’s role in adjudicating 
either state law issues in general, or state constitutional issues in 
particular, they would eliminate arbitrary distinctions in current 
doctrine, minimize unnecessary abstentions, and ensure that 
federal courts do not completely displace the state judiciary in 
resolving state constitutional questions. 
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND  
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
The Eleventh Amendment is another major obstacle to 
litigating state constitutional claims in federal court. On its face, 
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits in federal court against 
a state by citizens of other states.100 The Supreme Court has held 
that the underlying sovereign immunity principle the amendment 
codifies also protects a state from lawsuits by its own citizens.101 
Sovereign immunity extends not only to lawsuits against the state 
itself, but also state agencies102 and state officers acting in their 
official capacity.103 
Ex parte Young created an exception to state sovereign 
 
 98. See Morley, supra note 85, at 28 (defining “defendant-oriented injunctions”); see 
also id. at 25–27 (discussing the risk of overbroad associational injunctions completely 
prohibiting enforcement of a legal provision against anyone within a jurisdiction).  
 99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2018) (allowing district courts to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction in “exceptional circumstances,” for “compelling reasons”).  
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
 101. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1890). These prohibitions extend to lawsuits 
in both state and federal court. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019) 
(holding that a state is immune from private suits in other states’ courts); Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (same for a state’s own courts). 
 102. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781 (1978) (per curiam).  
 103. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–67 (1985).  
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immunity, holding that the Eleventh Amendment generally does 
not prohibit suits against state officers for injunctive relief against 
violations of the U.S. Constitution.104 The Court reasoned that 
state officers who violate the U.S. Constitution act without official 
authority, since a state cannot authorize constitutional 
violations.105 In such cases, the officer is “stripped of his official or 
representative character and is subjected in his person to the 
consequences of his individual conduct.”106 The suit “does not 
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.”107 
The Court refused to extend this approach to state officials’ 
alleged violations of state constitutions, however. In Pennhurst 
State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the Supreme Court held 
that the Eleventh Amendment protects states, state agencies, and 
state officers from being sued in federal court for violations of 
state law, including a state constitution.108 Even when a plaintiff 
brings a federal constitutional challenge under Ex parte Young, 
sovereign immunity still applies to any pendent claims under the 
state constitution.109 Pennhurst explained that the Young 
exception arises from the special “need to promote the 
vindication of federal rights,” which is categorically inapplicable 
to a state constitutional claim.110 Furthermore, instructing “state 
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law” is a much 
greater “intrusion on state sovereignty” than enforcing the U.S. 
Constitution.111 
Pennhurst does not completely preclude federal courts from 
adjudicating state constitutional claims; for example, they may 
still hear suits against counties, municipalities, and their officials, 
who are all unable to invoke sovereign immunity.112 Nevertheless, 
the ruling impairs plaintiffs’ ability to litigate state constitutional 
claims in federal court, since certain claims may be brought only 
against state agencies or officials. If rightholders suing such 
defendants wish to preserve their right to a federal forum, they 
 
 104. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). To fall within the Young exception, 
the injunctive relief must be prospective, rather than retrospective, in nature. Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).  
 105. Young, 209 U.S. at 160.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 159.  
 108. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 105–06.  
 111. Id. at 106.  
 112. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).  
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must pursue their federal constitutional claims in federal court 
and state constitutional claims separately in state court. This 
approach involves substantial expense, inconvenience, and 
duplicative use of judicial resources. Perhaps more importantly, 
unlike with Pullman abstention, whichever case concludes first 
will give rise to res judicata, preventing the other proceeding from 
concluding.113 Alternatively, litigants may forego federal court by 
bringing both their federal and state constitutional challenges in 
state court, subject to the possibility of Supreme Court review. 
Scholars have thoroughly debated whether Pennhurst 
accurately interprets the Eleventh Amendment.114 Putting aside 
such larger-scale critiques, the Court could somewhat mitigate the 
obstacle that the Pennhurst Doctrine poses to the litigation of 
state constitutional claims through a simple procedural device: 
allowing plaintiffs to assert England reservations in state court 
cases brought due to the Pennhurst Doctrine. As noted earlier, 
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners provides 
that a plaintiff that is forced to litigate state law issues or claims in 
state court because a federal court has engaged in Pullman 
abstention may “reserve” the right to return to federal court to 
litigate its federal claims, if necessary.115 England is an exception 
to the res judicata principle that the state court’s judgment 
concerning state law claims or issues typically precludes 
subsequent litigation in federal court of federal constitutional 
claims arising from the same operative facts.116 
The Supreme Court has implied that England reservations 
apply only in cases involving Pullman abstention117 and repeatedly 
 
 113. Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh 
Amendment After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 658–59 (1985).  
 114. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and 
State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 52–62 (1988) (arguing that, although Pennhurst 
was based on a more historically accurate view of state sovereign immunity than Young, 
the Court’s conclusion was erroneous); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh 
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 84–85 (1984) (arguing that 
Pennhurst is based on a historically inaccurate view of sovereign immunity).  
 115.  See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  
 116. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84–85 (1984); see 
also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980). Federal law requires federal courts to apply 
state law to determine the res judicata effect of a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 
(2018); Allen, 449 U.S. at 96. 
 117. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 85 n.7 (holding that, when “federal and state-law claims 
are sufficiently intertwined,” a “plaintiff can preserve his right to a federal forum for his 
federal claims” if the “federal court abstains from passing on the federal claims to first 
allow the state court to address the state-law issues”). Some lower courts, however, have 
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declined to expand exceptions to res judicata principles.118 Some 
commentators have likewise concluded that federal courts must 
afford full res judicata effect to state court judgments issued in the 
Pennhurst context119 and decline to recognize England 
reservations.120 England’s reasoning, however, squarely supports 
recognizing an exception to res judicata when Pennhurst 
precludes plaintiffs from pursuing state constitutional claims 
against state officers in federal court.121 
England held that a “litigant who has properly invoked the 
jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal 
constitutional claims” should not be compelled, “without his 
consent and through no fault of his own, to accept instead a state 
court’s determination of those claims.”122 A state court’s role in 
interpreting state law cannot limit the federal judiciary’s 
“primacy . . . in deciding questions of federal law.”123 A plaintiff’s 
 
nevertheless enforced England reservations to allow plaintiffs who litigated state 
constitutional claims in state court due to the Pennhurst Doctrine to later turn to federal 
court to litigate federal constitutional issues. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of 
Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1211, 1268 & n.178 (2004) (citing cases).  
 118. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 84–85 (declining to recognize an exception to res judicata 
for § 1983 claims); Fed. Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (declining to 
recognize an exception to res judicata because the doctrine “serves vital public interests 
beyond any individual judge’s ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case”); 
see also Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917) (holding that res 
judicata “is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical 
time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public policy and of 
private peace, which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts” (quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 119. See, e.g., James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims 
Against State Entities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Seminole Tribe and 
Flores, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 651, 750–51 (1999); Robert H. Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman: 
The Eleventh Amendment, Erie, and Pendant State Law Claims, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 277 
(1985). But see David Shapiro, The Supreme Court, Comment, 1983 Term: Wrong Turns: 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 81 (1984). 
 120. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19 
GA. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1985) (“[T]he reservation procedure approved in England v. 
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners now appears to be unavailable outside the 
narrow ‘abstention’ context of the England case itself. That seems to be so even though [a] 
plaintiff’s post-Pennhurst litigation can scarcely be said to be voluntarily in state court.”); 
see also Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the 
Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 80 (1982); Leanne B. De Vos, Comment, 
Claim Preclusion and Section 1983 Civil Rights Actions: Migra v. Warren City School 
District Board of Education, 70 IOWA L. REV. 287, 303 (1984).  
 121. See, e.g., Del. Valley Transplant Prog. v. Coye, 722 F. Supp. 1188, 1198–99 (D.N.J. 
1989); cf. Friedman, supra note 117, at 1268–69.  
 122. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).  
 123. Id. at 415–16.  
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ability to seek a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court 
from a state court’s ruling on a federal issue is no substitute for 
the right to litigate that federal claim in federal court in the first 
instance.124 
Although England concerned the right to return to federal 
court after litigating state law issues in state court as a result of 
Pullman abstention, this reasoning is equally applicable in the 
context of the Pennhurst Doctrine. Both Pullman abstention and 
the Pennhurst Doctrine are constitutionally rooted, judicially 
created principles that require litigation of certain state law claims 
in state court to protect state sovereignty. Applying res judicata 
in either context would impede plaintiffs’ access to a federal 
forum for the adjudication of their federal rights. 
On the other hand, a major difference between Pullman 
abstention and the Pennhurst Doctrine is that the former can be 
completely unavoidable, whereas a plaintiff may always avoid the 
latter by foregoing its state law claims. Pullman abstention applies 
whenever resolution of an unsettled issue of state law—including 
a state constitutional issue—could alleviate the need for a federal 
court to reach a federal constitutional ruling.125 Accordingly, a 
federal court may engage in Pullman abstention and require a 
plaintiff to litigate a state law issue in state court even when a 
complaint raises only federal claims.126 In such cases, there is no 
way for a plaintiff with federal claims to retain its right to a federal 
forum without an exception to res judicata principles. 
With the Pennhurst Doctrine, in contrast, a plaintiff may 
guarantee its right to litigate its federal constitutional claims 
against state officials in a federal forum simply by foregoing any 
pendent claims under the state constitution. State sovereign 
immunity poses no obstacle to pursuing federal constitutional 
claims against state officials in federal court;127 Pennhurst’s 
restrictions are triggered only by a plaintiff’s choice to also pursue 
state law claims for which the state enjoys sovereign immunity. If 
federal courts wish to follow Sutton’s advice and promote state 
constitutions as vibrant, independent sources of rights, however, 
they should not force plaintiffs to forego state constitutional 
claims as a condition for litigating their federal constitutional 
 
 124. Id. at 416–17.  
 125.  See supra notes 57–58, 63 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 478 (1971). 
 127.  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). 
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rights in federal court. Assuming the Supreme Court intends to 
retain its current conception of state sovereign immunity, 
including the Pennhurst Doctrine, it should enforce England 
reservations in that context. In other words, when the Pennhurst 
Doctrine requires a plaintiff to litigate state constitutional claims 
against state officials in state court, res judicata should not 
preclude that plaintiff from subsequently litigating its related 
federal constitutional claims against those defendants in federal 
court. 
IV. DECLINING SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION  
OVER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
When neither abstention requirements nor the Eleventh 
Amendment prohibits a federal court from adjudicating state 
constitutional claims, it usually may still decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims in federal question 
cases. District courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over 
state constitutional claims per se. They may exercise diversity 
jurisdiction over such claims, in the rare circumstances they arise 
in litigation between citizens of different states.128 Most 
opportunities to adjudicate state constitutional claims, however, 
arise in federal question cases. Plaintiffs pursuing federal causes 
of action may invoke the court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 to assert state law claims arising from the same 
“core nucleus of operative fact” as their federal claims.129 In City 
of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, for example, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated a local 
ordinance under parallel provisions of the federal and Texas 
constitutions.130 
Unlike most other grants of subject-matter jurisdiction,131 
 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018); see Roger F. Williams, Foreword: Continued 
Commitment to State Constitutional Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 317, 318 (2004); see also 
Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 60 & n.295 
(2007).  
 129. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2018); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 
(1966).  
 130. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 291 (1982). The Supreme 
Court remanded the case so the Fifth Circuit could clarify whether its ruling on the state 
constitutional claim constituted independent and adequate state law grounds for its 
judgment. Id. at 295.  
 131. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976) (discussing the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them”).  
3 MORLEY 12/29/2020 11:21 PM 
2020] BOOK REVIEWS 427 
 
however, supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary.132 In a federal 
question case, § 1367(c)(1) allows a district court to decline 
jurisdiction over a state law claim that raises “a novel or complex 
issue of State law.”133 A separate provision allows the court to 
similarly refuse jurisdiction over pendent claims, including state 
constitutional claims, when all of the federal claims in the suit 
have been dismissed.134 The Supreme Court has directed lower 
courts to exercise this discretion “in the manner that best serves 
the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”135 
Whereas Pullman abstention applies only when a plaintiff has 
brought a federal constitutional challenge,136 district courts may 
decline supplemental jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the 
underlying federal causes of action. 
District courts frequently refuse to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over state constitutional challenges to state and local 
legal provisions,137 particularly where the state supreme court 
does not construe its state constitution in lockstep with the U.S. 
Constitution138 or the relevant provisions of the two charters 
materially differ from each other.139 Federal courts explain that 
such dismissals demonstrate “respect for the right of a state court 
system to construe that state’s own constitution.”140 This 
 
 132. See City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 
 133. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).  
 134. Id. § 1367(c)(3); see, e.g., Watson v. City of Allen, 821 F.3d 624, 642 (5th Cir. 
2016). 
 135. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172–73 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill, 
484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).  
 136. See supra notes 57–58, 63 and accompanying text. 
 137. E.g., Peterson v. Miami Corr. Facility, No. 3:07-CV-397, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34565, at *17 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2008); Mulgrew v. Fumo, No. 03-CV-5039, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14654, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2004); Lansing Mercy Ambulance Serv. v. Tri-Cnty. 
Emergency Med. Cont. Auth., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1337, 1348 (W.D. Mich. 1995); see also 
Patel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:13-CV-09358-SVW-AS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196990, 
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014); Akrawi v. Remillet, No. 10-13234, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115134, at *38 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2011); Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, No. 2:05-CV-
638 (DAK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55024, at *10 (D. Utah June 2, 2010).  
 138. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff’s free exercise and establishment clause claims under the Utah Constitution, 
because the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of those provisions does “not follow 
federal constitutional models” and “appears to be undergoing an evolution”), aff’d in 
relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
 139. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 483, 487 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  
 140. Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Collins v. Daniels, 
No. 1:17-CV-00776-RJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225034, at *67 (D.N.M. Dec. 11, 2017); 
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consistent reluctance to adjudicate state constitutional claims is 
another contributing factor that deters plaintiffs from devoting 
time and resources to attempting to litigate them in federal court. 
Sutton’s concern about the lack of state constitutional claims 
in federal court (p. 8) suggests that lower courts should reconsider 
their consistent reluctance to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over them. In the post-Erie world, state courts are the final 
expositors of state law, including state constitutional law. When a 
federal court adjudicates a state constitutional issue, it is primarily 
performing a dispute resolution, rather than law exposition, 
function141—particularly since its interpretation of the state 
constitution is not binding on state courts. Viewed from that 
perspective, allowing federal courts to resolve state constitutional 
issues expedites resolution of cases and reduces litigants’ costs by 
eliminating the need for parallel state court litigation. 
Moreover, Professor Robert Schapiro argues that federal 
courts’ adjudication of state constitutional issues facilitates cross-
pollination of ideas and can provide greater protection than 
elected state judges for members of politically unpopular 
groups.142 Input from federal courts may improve the quality of 
state courts’ constitutional interpretation by promoting a dialogue 
between the courts. As an alternate forum for construing state 
constitutional provisions—albeit not definitively—federal courts 
can also act as a check, deterring state courts from underenforcing 
state constitutional norms.143 
On the other hand, federal courts’ adjudication of state 
constitutional claims can hinder the ability of state courts to 
develop their own body of state constitutional law distinct from 
federal constitutional law. Every state constitutional issue that a 
federal court adjudicates is a missed opportunity for state courts 
to articulate state constitutional norms for themselves. And as a 
body of federal precedent concerning the meaning of state 
constitutional provisions develops, it may exert a gravitational 
force on state courts’ reasoning, even though it is not formally 
binding.144 As noted earlier, federal courts also risk reaching 
 
Smith v. Carrasco, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (N.D. Ind. 2004).  
 141. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual 
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 494 (1994).  
 142. Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1441–48. 
 143. Id. at 1450–51.  
 144. Cf. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
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erroneous conclusions about state constitutional provisions 
without the opportunity for correction by the state supreme court. 
Thus, § 1367(c)(1) raises many of the same questions 
concerning the proper role of federal courts in construing state 
law as the Pullman abstention doctrine.145 Rather than treating 
these as distinct issues, the Court should apply a single, consistent 
standard to both. Pullman abstention occurs when an unsettled 
issue of state law arises in a case involving a claim under the U.S. 
Constitution.146 Section 1367(c)(1) applies when a novel issue of 
state law arises in a federal question case.147 The former may 
therefore be seen as simply a special case of the latter. Instead of 
construing § 1367(c)(1) as an independent, broad grant of 
discretion to district courts,148 it should be read as codifying  
the same standard for declining supplemental jurisdiction as 
Pullman establishes for abstention—however the Court chooses 
to define it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
51 Imperfect Solutions demonstrates the various ways in 
which federal and state constitutional law interact. Sometimes, 
state courts construe state constitutions to protect individual 
rights to a greater extent than the U.S. Constitution. In other 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the 
federal Constitution induces state courts to adopt similarly limited 
constructions of analogous provisions within their own 
constitutions. And in still others, state supreme courts’ 
interpretations of their respective charters influence the U.S. 
Supreme Court to broaden its approach to the U.S. Constitution. 
While Sutton emphasizes the important role that state courts 
 
703, 725–26 (2016).  
 145. See David D. Siegel, Practice Commentary: The 1990 Adoption of § 1367, 
Codifying “Supplemental” Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367, at 834–35 (West 1993); 
Deborah J. Challener & John B. Howell, III, Remand and Appellate Review When a 
District Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 81 
TEMP. L. REV. 1067, 1099 n.195 (2008); cf. Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1421 n.52 (“Section 
1367’s codification of novelty and complexity presents some tension with the doctrine of 
Pullman abstention.”); Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow 
Directions: When District Courts Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 995, 1021 (1998) (arguing that 
§ 1367(c)(1) does not codify Pullman abstention).  
 146. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).  
 147. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2018).  
 148. Cf. City of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 
MORLEY 35:2 12/29/2020 11:21 PM 
430 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:401 
 
play in construing state constitutions, the book leaves unanswered 
questions about the role of federal judges. Current Supreme Court 
doctrine is riddled with inconsistencies. A federal court’s ability to 
resolve unsettled issues of state law differs depending on whether a 
case arises under its federal question or diversity jurisdiction.149 For 
state constitutional claims, a federal court’s power depends on 
whether the provision at issue has an analogue in the federal 
constitution.150 The Court should synthesize its precedents in this area 
and articulate a coherent theory—a theory rooted in considerations 
of federalism, comity, judicial economy, and concern for the adequate 
and accurate enforcement of litigants’ underlying substantive rights—
about federal judges’ responsibility, if any, for addressing unsettled 
state law issues. 
Scholars such as Professor Robert Schapiro urge a broad role, 
emphasizing the value of inter-court dialogue.151 Others, such as 
Judge Dolores Sloviter of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
are more concerned about federal judges’ limited ability to correctly 
anticipate how state supreme courts will resolve unsettled state law 
issues.152 As a first step, this Review suggests initial procedural 
reforms to reduce friction between federal and state courts and 
promote consistency and predictability in the litigation of state 
constitutional issues. 51 Imperfect Solutions helpfully spotlights state 
constitutions as an important substantive source of rights, but we 
must give equal consideration to the challenging procedural issues 




 149. Compare Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500 (requiring federal courts to abstain from 
adjudicating unsettled issues of state law in cases involving a claim under the U.S. 
Constitution), with Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943) (generally 
prohibiting federal courts from abstaining from adjudicating unsettled issues of state law 
in diversity cases).  
 150. Compare Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970) (requiring federal courts to 
abstain from adjudicating federal constitutional claims to allow state courts to first address 
potential claims under narrow, unique provisions of state constitutions), with Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1971) (prohibiting federal courts from abstaining 
from adjudicating federal constitutional claims to allow state courts to first address 
potential claims under analogous state constitutional provision).  
 151. Schapiro, supra note 84, at 1441–48. 
 152. Sloviter, supra note 66, at 1681.  
 153. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).  
